Decentralized Tech

Core Principle: Uniqueness is verified through multiple, independent attestations without a single authority holding all identity data.

1. System Components

• User Wallet: A user-controlled app (mobile/web) storing:
  • Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs)
  • Verifiable Credentials (VCs) from issuers
  • Zero-Knowledge Proof (ZKP) tools
• Attesters: Independent entities issuing VCs (e.g., government, banks, NGOs, community leaders).
• Verifier Node: Validates ZKPs for uniqueness during voting.
• Blockchain: Public ledger for auditing attestations (storing hashes only, not raw data).

2. Workflow: Registration & Voting

Phase 1: Identity Attestation (Off-Chain)

• User collects VCs from ≥3 diverse attesters:
  • Example Attesters:
    • National ID office (confirms citizenship)
    • Local bank (confirms residency via utility bill)
    • Community leader (confirms residence via affidavit).
• Each VC contains a cryptographic commitment to the user’s biometric/pseudonym.

Phase 2: Uniqueness Proof (ZKP)

• User generates a ZKP proving:
  • They hold valid VCs from ≥3 distinct attesters.
  • All VCs refer to the same unique person (via biometric/pseudonym commitment).
  • No personal data is revealed (only proof of validity and uniqueness).

Phase 3: Voting

• User submits ZKP to the Verifier Node.
• Verifier checks:
  • Validity of ZKP.
  • Attesters are pre-approved/trusted.
  • Proof hasn’t been used before (via blockchain record).
• If valid, user receives a one-time voting token.

3. Ensuring Uniqueness

• Sybil Resistance:
  • A single person can’t get multiple VCs from colluding attesters without detection (auditable via blockchain).
  • Attesters risk reputation loss if caught issuing duplicate credentials.
• Pseudonymity Protection:
  • Users can rotate DIDs between elections.
  • No central database links votes to real-world IDs.

4. Mitigating Risks

• Marginalized Communities (e.g., Bihar):
  • Allow non-documentary attestations (e.g., community affidavits).
  • Use grassroots attesters (local NGOs, tribal councils).
• Government Coercion:
  • Attesters store data locally (no central honeypot).
  • VCs expire after voting, limiting exposure.
• Logistical Feasibility:
  • Leverage existing infrastructure (Aadhaar, bank IDs) without creating dependencies.

5. PoC Implementation Steps

1. Test Environment: Simulate a local election (e.g., 1,000 users).
2. Attester Roles:
   • Government agency (issues citizenship VC).
   • Postal service (issues residency VC).
   • Local NGO (issues community membership VC).
3. User Flow:
   • Scan QR codes from attesters to collect VCs in wallet.
   • Generate ZKP for uniqueness.
   • Cast anonymized vote via token.
4. Auditing:
   • Public blockchain records ZKP hashes and attester IDs.
   • Anyone can verify election integrity without compromising privacy.

6. Advantages Over Worldcoin/Bihar Model

Key Innovations

• Social Graph Integration: As Buterin suggested, leverage “web of trust” (e.g., existing verified users vouch for newcomers).
• Progressive Uniqueness: Start with low-stakes elections (community polls) to refine attestation thresholds.
• Fallback Mechanisms: If 3 VCs are unattainable, allow 5+ “social attestations” from trusted neighbors (with fraud penalties).

This PoC shifts Sybil resistance from biometric singularity (privacy-invasive) to pluralistic validation (privacy-preserving), aligning with Buterin’s vision while addressing real-world constraints like those in Bihar.

Sources:

• Vitalik Buterin has reservations about Sam Altman’s World project
• Why EC move to create new Bihar voter list has rung the ‘NRC’ alarm bell

Prompt:

-i like Buterins thoughts. how do we ensure uniqueness though for example in situations like voting though? devise a Proof of Concept plan.

Model:

• Deepseek Reasoner

AI Chain of Thought

Okay, the user has shared two distinct articles and asked for a Proof of Concept plan implementing Vitalik Buterin’s pluralistic identity approach. Let me unpack this carefully.

First article covers Buterin’s critique of Worldcoin’s biometric ID system. His core argument resonates - centralized “one-per-person” IDs create surveillance risks even with zero-knowledge proofs. The US visa/social media example shows how governments can force identity linkage. Buterin proposes “pluralistic identity” with no single issuing authority, using either social graph verification or multiple identity systems.

Second article shows real-world consequences of centralized ID systems - Bihar’s voter list revision requiring 293 million people to prove citizenship with documents many lack. This disproportionately affects marginalized groups like Musahar/Dom communities and Bengali-speaking Muslims in Seemanchal. The parallels to NRC are alarming.

User seems technically literate (“like Buterin’s thoughts”) but wants concrete implementation - specifically for voting systems requiring uniqueness. The challenge is balancing Sybil resistance with privacy/decentralization.

Hmm... how to architect this? Should combine:

• Social graph web-of-trust (like Keybase)
• Existing credentials (national ID, bank accounts)
• Optional biometrics (with strict decentralization)
• Blockchain for auditing without central DB

For voting use case:

• Registrars could be local trusted entities (libraries, post offices)
• Verification via multiple attestations (e.g. 3 neighbors confirm your residence)
• ZK-proofs to separate eligibility verification from identity

Biggest hurdles:

• Preventing collusion in web-of-trust
• Onboarding illiterate populations
• Government coercion risks remain

User might be building a governance system - should emphasize anti-fragile design. Also note that Bihar case shows digital solutions can’t fix documentation gaps; need fallback mechanisms like community affidavits.

The PoC should probably start with small communities (DAOs? university towns) before scaling. Stress-test against real-world constraints like migration patterns in Bihar.